![]() ![]() One unchanging feature of John Rawls' thought is that we theorize about well-ordered societies. In this paper I argue that regardless of which plausible interpretation of acting from overdetermined motives we adopt, the prospect of citizens realizing their full autonomy in Rawls’s PL are small. This raises the interesting question of acting from overdetermined motives in Kant’s system of ethics. The problem is that in the well-ordered society of PL people’s reasons for complying with the principles of justice are overdetermined in a problematic way. Though the model of the well-ordered society presented in TJ is arguably consistent with Kant’s notion of autonomy, the model of the well-ordered society presented in PL is not. This constancy, I shall argue, raises problems. ![]() This notion of full autonomy is explicitly Kantian. One feature of John Rawls’s well-ordered society in both A Theory of Justice (TJ) and Political Liberalism (PL) is that citizens in the well-ordered society, when adhering to the principles of justice governing that society, realize their full autonomy. ![]()
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